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Book Reviews: ComparativePolitics
from his numerousstudies of Iran's internal
and externalpolitics. The resultis a work that
is characterizedby a high degreeof authenticity and integrity.
Bill'sthesis is that U.S. policy toward Iran
by deepsincethe 1940shas beencharacterized
ly disturbinginconsistencies;willful intervention; fractured communicationsamong the
numerous official U.S. agencies both inside
and outside Iran; endemic rivalries among
members of U.S. civilian and military missions; cultural insensitivitiesand misperceptions; myopia concerning the alleged communistthreatto Iran;andexcessiverelianceon
contacts with Iran'sgovernmentalelite, especiallythe shah. Billbelievesthat thesedeficiencies were responsiblenot only for the United
States'failureto anticipateand act to prevent
an Iranianrevolutionbut also for its inability
to come to termswith the revolutionafterthe
fact.
Among the most compellingparts of this
book are the discussionof the genesis of the
U.S. commitmentto the shah in the 1940s;the
analysis of the interrelationshipsamong the
variousU.S. and.Britishoil companies;the impact of private sector figures (such as David
Lillienthalof the TennesseeValley Authority,
David Rockefellerof ChaseManhattanBank,
and the newly retired but vigorously active
Henry Kissinger)on U.S. policy; and Washington's catastrophicinsistencethat Iran approve a humiliatingStatus of Forces AgreeUniversityof Washington
ment in 1964. With the exceptionof Truman,
postwar U.S. presidentsreceive poor marks:
Eisenhowerbecause of his sanctioningof the
The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of
CIAcoup of 1953;Kennedybecausehis reform
American-IranianRelations.By JamesA.
proposalswere reallyintendedto preservethe
Bill. New Haven: Yale University Press,
statusquo; Johnsonbecausehe believedin the
1988. 520p. $30.00 cloth, $13.95 paper.
shah'suse of force and admiredhis apparently
stable rule, as well as his supportof the U.S.
JamesBill has written a most valuableand
war in Vietnam;Nixon because of his blank
trenchant critique of U.S. foreign policy
toward Iran in the Pahlavi and post-Pahlavi checkof 1972on armstransfersto Iran;Carter
because he praised Iran's stability and later
periods. The authorhas based his study on a
great array of sources, includingdeclassified followed Brzezinski'shawkishadvice to try to
derailthe revolution-in-progress
by a military
U.S. government documents (plus those
"declassified"
by the studenthostagetakersat
coup(t);and Reaganbecauseof his demonizing
of the Iranianregimeand of coursehis involvethe U.S. embassy after their assault in
ment in the Iran-Contrascandal.
November 1979); personal letters and
There are many lessons to be learned, and
memoranda; interviews with key policy
makers;internalIraniansources;and informal Bill providesa checklistof some 12 points for
futureconsiderationto avert the continuation
discussions with U.S. and Iranian public
of the tragedyin U.S.-Iranianrelations.These
figures. Bill has accumulateda wealth of experiencein his manyyearsof travelto Iranand
rangefroma skepticaland questioningattitude

generalists(pp. 52, 157). Baumgartnerconcedes that "participation
levels were not enormous" in this latter group, but insists that
"evensmall changescan sometimesbe important"(p. 158).
Though he may thus be faulted for overemphasizing the independent effect of
"rhetoric," Baumgartnervividly illustrates
how such variablesas degreeof conflict and
environment combine with the strategic
behavior of policy makers to determinethe
nature of participationand policy outcomes.
His case studies provide not only the most
systematicaccountto date of the dynamicsof
educationalpolicy makingin Francebut also a
generallyuseful guide to the respectiveroles
played by civil servants,interestgroups, and
political elites in the policy making process.
Moreover, his analysis of the role of parliament as the "courtof last appealfor potential
expanders"in France(chap.8) is quiteenlightening, as is his explanation(chap. 9) of how
political and structural differencesbetween
Franceand the United Stateshave resultedin
contractionof the debate over nuclearpower
in the former and expansion in the latter.
Specialistsin both Frenchpoliticsand comparative public policy will thus find this book to
be a significantand provocativecontribution
to the literature.
JOHNT. S. KEELER
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Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth
toward any sacred cow assumptionsin U.S.
Century Mexico. By Roderic A. Camp.
foreign policy making and prevention of
New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1989.
private interestsfrom overtakingpublic U.S.
306p. $35.00.
intereststo quashingthe urge to attributeall
problems to communist activity, eschewing Lawand MarketSocietyin Mexico.By George
M. Armstrong, Jr. New York: Praeger,
simplisticresortto force, fully trainingdiplo1989. 174p. $39.95.
mats in all the skills neededto understandthe
societies to which they are posted, consulting
No one seems to be able to come up with a
more with nongovernmentalsources for advice and information,moderatingbureaucratic term capturing,the essence of the Mexican
economic system. Massive state intervention
conflict, and institutinglong-rangeplanning.
It detractsnothingfromthe integrityof Bill's rules out capitalism or market economy;
socialism is hardly compatiblewith the enorscholarshipto note, however, that almost no
mous accumulationof personal wealth by a
one anticipatedthat a revolutionwould break
fortunateminority;and plannedeconomyfails
out in Iran.It is also not patentlyobvious that
because plans are routinely ignored or
the sort of subtle and orchestratedpatternof
aborted. Neither Armstrong nor Camp atinitiatives and responses preferred by the
temptsto coin a satisfactoryterm;rather,they
authorto assistin the evolution of Iraniannaenrich our insights as to why Mexico's
tional developmentis in fact feasible. Given
economicsystem seems so label-proof.
what we know about the enormouslycompliArmstrong employs a historical-legalapcatedproblemsof formulatingand implementproach in analyzingthe originsof contempoing foreignpolicy, it shouldbe relativelyclear
rary socioeconomic difficulties in Mexico.
that actions are often the outcome of uninTheseproblems,he believes,stemfromendurtended causes. This problembecomes all the
greaterwhen it is appreciatedthat revolution- ing culturaltraitsand traditionsthatprevented
Mexicofrom developinga materialisticsociety
ary movementshave a momentumand force
imbuedwith egoismand individualautonomy,
of theirown, a point madeby GarySickin All
Fall Down (1985). Even under nonrevolu- which areprerequisitesfor a marketeconomy.
Communitarianpaternalism,which was prestionarycircumstances,the foreignpolicy process can sometimesbe such a bewilderingseries ent in the initial blending of Indian and
Spanishcultures,has endured;and in thatconof fits and starts;assumptionsand plans;bartext earlierpracticesof mortmain,entail, and
gaining, payoffs, and side-payments;initiadebt peonage are directly connectedwith totives and demarches;implementationand subday's corporatistpractices of the PRI, graft
version-that it can defy efforts at carefulraand corruption by public officials, and the
tionalization.Finally,while greatpowershave
of the Mexicaneconomythrough
"6tatization"
historicallyfound it relativelyeasy to roil the
state enterprises.
waters in their relationswith small states, efCampis perhapsbest knownfor his Mexican
forts at regulationof developmentshave been
far less successful.The questionmustbe stark- PoliticalBiographies,1935-1980(1982)andIntellectualsand the State in TwentiethCentury
ly posed: What are the limits to great power
Mexico (1985). In Entrepreneursand Politics
ability to modulatetrendsin other lands?
he continuesto use personalinterviewsas the
Yet I take it to be JamesBill'sresponsethat
basic methodology. Essentially,the book is a
even if this ability is limited, it is possiblefor
report on empiricalfindings on the changing
great powers to be less disruptive,less interventionist, less provocative, less insensitive, relationshipbetween the entrepreneurialclass
and government.The analysisdrawson an upless domineering, less cavalier. Those who
have studiedU.S. relationswith MiddleEast- datedcollectionof politicalleaders(2,850complete cases since 18841),interviewswith leadern countriessuch as Iranand in generalwith
ing intellectuals,and his more recent interThird World countries deemed vital to U.S.
views with prominentMexicanentrepreneurs.
securityinterestscan only say amen.
In addition, Camp compiled informationon
SHAHROUGH
AKHAVI
the interlockingassociationsof leading entrepreneurialgroups and familieswho have ties
Universityof South Carolina
with the two hundredtop Mexicanfirms.
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